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Religious Freedom and (Other) Civil Liberties:
Is There a Middle Ground?
Abner S. Greene*
INTRODUCTION:
VALUE PLURALISM AND THE MIDDLE GROUND
Some people believe in an extrahuman source of normative authority,
in a God who created the world and everything in it and whose normative
dictates are knowable and obligatory. Others believe the opposite—we
might call them atheists, or materialists, or naturalists. To some extent both
sides can get along just fine; religious worship, and secular practice (to the
extent it exists), can occur in separate places, separate lives, without either
needing to give way. But sometimes one side makes a demand that impinges
on the other side. A law may be expressly and predominantly based in a
contested, core belief of one side or the other. Or an otherwise unobjection-
able law may have effects that harm the practices of one side or the other.
Whatever result we endorse to these dilemmas—permitting (or not) laws
based expressly in contested comprehensive views; accommodating (or not)
beliefs or practices adversely affected by otherwise valid legislation—there
will be a cost, one way or the other.
These dilemmas could exist in either direction: We could consider law
expressly based in theological doctrine problematic or law expressly based
in some contested secular belief problematic. We could consider a claim for
religious accommodation worthy of note or we could consider a claim for
secular accommodation worthy of note. Or some combination of all of these.
Our constitutional culture, though, works from a premise of secularism, at
least in the following way: law may have religious underpinnings, but it may
not be merely the expression of God’s will. We are not a theocracy.1 Also,
with lots of details to be worked out, we are sympathetic to claims of relig-
ious folk that sometimes law will harm their practices. Although the exact
contours of the “religious purpose” Establishment Clause test are contested,
and although the proper constitutional boundaries of accommodation and
exemption are contested, there should be some easy cases where express
* Leonard F. Manning Professor, Fordham Law School. Thanks to Paul Horwitz, Julie
Kalish, and John Nagle for helpful comments. Thanks also to Nomi Stolzenberg, Doug
NeJaime, and all the organizers of the fascinating and provocative conference that gave rise to
this set of papers: Religious Accommodation in the Age of Civil Rights, Harvard Law School,
April 3–5, 2014.
1 If we were, and we took the kinds of harm I’m discussing here seriously, then we would
be talking about accommodation for nonbelievers from these expressions of God’s will.
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backing of legislation on sectarian grounds is improper2 or where an accom-
modation would harm no one and benefit an otherwise beleaguered religious
minority.
To some extent, the Supreme Court’s religion clauses jurisprudence pre-
Smith reflected this understanding.3 On Establishment Clause grounds, the
Supreme Court invalidated legislation expressly based in religious justifica-
tion.4 The Court permitted some legislative accommodation of religion.5 And
the Court said the Free Exercise Clause requires exemptions from state ac-
tion that burdens religious practice, even if unintentionally.6 Even after
Smith changed the doctrinal landscape regarding required exemptions, the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) for the federal government,7 and
state RFRAs,8 insist on a robust approach to religious exemptions.9
My argument in The Political Balance of the Religion Clauses10 was an
attempt at locating this middle ground, too. We might read the Establishment
and Free Exercise Clauses in tandem to produce the following conclusion:
Legislation may not be based in express, predominant religious argumenta-
tion. Such a capturing of the legislative process excludes from meaningful
participation in the political process those who don’t share the dominant re-
ligious beliefs. Justice Souter stated a similar concern in his majority opinion
in McCreary County, when he explained that state action backed by express,
predominant religious purpose “stirs up . . . strife” and “make[s] outsiders
of nonadherents.”11 But if we are to limit the role of religion in lawmaking
2 I recognize this is a disputed matter among scholars, even though there is a well-settled
set of Supreme Court cases so holding. See infra note 4. See also Abner S. Greene, The Politi- R
cal Balance of the Religion Clauses, 102 YALE L.J. 1611, 1614–33 (1993).
3 See Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 908–09 (1990) (holding that strict scrutiny does
not apply to Free Exercise Clause claims stemming from the incidental effect of generally
applicable laws).
4 See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 596–97 (1987); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38,
61 (1985); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 113 (1968). See also McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU
of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 881 (2005) (after Smith).
5 See Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v.
Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 338–40 (1987). See also Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 725–26
(2005) (after Smith).
6 See Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n, 480 U.S. 136, 145–46 (1987); Thomas
v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 720 (1981); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 235–36 (1972);
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 409–10 (1963). Yoder is a true case of required exemption
from generally applicable law; the other three—all unemployment compensation cases—ar-
guably are not, but rather protections against administrative discrimination against religion.
See Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, The Vulnerability of Conscience: The
Constitutional Basis for Protecting Religious Conduct, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1245, 1280 (1994).
7 See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2785 (2014); Gonzales v. O
Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao Do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 439 (2006). But see City of
Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 526 (1997) (invaliding RFRA as applied to state and local
governments).
8 See generally Christopher C. Lund, Religious Liberty After Gonzales: A Look at State
RFRAs, 55 S.D. L. REV. 466 (2010).
9 Also, the Court has held that the religion clauses require exception from employment
anti-discrimination law for church ministerial positions. See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lu-
theran Church and Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 710 (2012).
10 Greene, supra note 2. R
11 McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 863 (2005).
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in this way, then we have constrained religious folk in how they may ad-
vance what they believe to be true in the political realm. Such limitation on
the political process undermines the legitimacy of the state’s claim for uni-
form adherence to enacted law. Exemptions (even prima facie only, i.e., sub-
ject to a balancing test to account for harm to others) are an appropriate
antidote, or compensation, for religious believers. Even if one doesn’t accept
the precise contours of this compensation argument, the point is that we have
reached a tenable middle ground about keeping religion out of law (for the
most pronounced situations) and keeping law out of religion (ditto).
This was an interpretive claim about our Constitution. In my book
Against Obligation, I advance a political theoretic argument for accommoda-
tions beyond religious practice.12 Here is a summary of the case: We do not
have a moral duty to obey the law, and the state does not have a legitimate
claim on our legal compliance.13 I canvass various arguments for political
obligation, rejecting each as not powerful enough to back the state’s claim
for uniform obedience to law. Thus, I first discuss and reject agent-centered
arguments for political obligation—from consent, fair play, and political
participation. Consent would properly ground political obligation, but
viewed as either express or implied, it doesn’t exist sufficiently. A duty of
fair play may ground some political obligations for some people, but it is
also too weak to ground a general duty to obey the law. Political participa-
tion may be necessary for political obligation (at least a right to political
participation is), but it is also insufficient. It is not general enough, and it is
not clear enough that when people vote or otherwise participate in govern-
ance they thereby understand themselves as bound by resulting laws.
I then turn to status-based claims for political obligation—a natural
duty to obey just institutions and associative obligation. My principal objec-
tions to the natural duty argument are that it is based in a conception of
justness that is too weak to support a general moral duty to obey the law and
that it trades off a conception of reasonableness that does not adequately
account for those whose religious, cultural, ethnic, tribal, or family norms
insist on something different. I treat the argument for associative obligation
at greatest length. There are serious claims that we owe our fellow citizens a
duty to obey the law, claims that are separate from the fair play, natural duty,
or consequentialist arguments to which they are sometimes related. But al-
though we owe certain obligations to those with whom we have real associa-
tions (family, friends, colleagues), it is a stretch to extend this idea to
citizens qua citizens and to a moral duty to obey the law.
Finally, I explore consequentialist, systemic stability arguments for po-
litical obligation—the kind of argument one most often hears in casual con-
versation. ‘If we don’t have a moral duty to obey the law, then people will go
12 See generally ABNER S. GREENE, AGAINST OBLIGATION: THE MULTIPLE SOURCES OF
AUTHORITY IN A LIBERAL DEMOCRACY (2012).
13 I advance an argument for the correlativity or coextensivity of political obligation and
political legitimacy, relying on a narrow but strong conception of political legitimacy. See id.
at 24–34.
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off in their chaotic different directions, and the system will collapse.’ In re-
jecting this kind of claim, I discuss and reject an argument against self-
interest and an argument from settlement. These arguments either improp-
erly assume the conclusion about systemic costs (while often failing to ac-
count for costs from being law-abiding) or they advantage those whose
norms fall toward the acceptable middle, in similar fashion to problems with
the argument from a natural duty to obey just institutions.
Once I conclude that there are no good arguments—separately or com-
bined—for political obligation and political legitimacy, I then have set the
predicate for an argument for accommodation. Similarly to my “political
balance” argument, but more broadly writ, I claim that to ameliorate the
sting from the otherwise unfounded insistence on uniform legal obedience,
the state should accommodate those who live according to norms that differ
from those of the law—norms that may be based in religion, culture, ethnic-
ity, tribe, or family.14 I also offer an affirmative rather than compensatory
argument for accommodations, grounded in value pluralism. There are many
sources of norms by which people live their lives, the state’s laws being just
one. It is proper for the state, when it can, to recognize and accommodate the
various norms by which people live. Sovereignty should be seen as permea-
ble through the state’s law and into our separate sources of norms. I then
explore how we might account for these sprawling, centrifugal norms, while
still running a stable system from the center.
The question will always be in the details: How do we evaluate the
need for uniform enforcement versus the need for accommodation? To insist
on one or the other to the extreme is to insist on the truth of one’s position in
a way that threatens a certain kind of fundamentalism, a sureness of one’s
position, which is improper both as a matter of political theory and as a
matter of constitutional law.15 In the remainder of this article, I first discuss
contemporary works by intellectual historians, each of whom resists the kind
of pluralism I advance.16 I then criticize Ronald Dworkin’s final book17 for
adopting both too expansive a view of religion and too narrow a view of
how to protect it. Next, I evaluate the Court’s holding in the most recent
14 Such accommodations should be subject to a balancing test, to assure they do not cause
significant harm to others.
15 In addition to my “political balance” argument discussed above regarding the religion
clauses, I have argued that our Constitution generally requires a kind of agnosticism/multiple
repositories of power. See generally Abner S. Greene, Civil Society and Multiple Repositories
of Power, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 477 (2000); Abner S. Greene, The Irreducible Constitution,
76 SAN DIEGO J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 293 (1996); Abner S. Greene, Kiryas Joel and Two
Mistakes About Equality, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1996). See also PAUL HORWITZ, THE AGNOS-
TIC AGE: LAW, RELIGION, AND THE CONSTITUTION (2011).
16 For fairly recent support for pluralism in the political arena, see J. DONALD MOON,
CONSTRUCTING COMMUNITY: MORAL PLURALISM AND TRAGIC CONFLICTS 8–9, 220–21 (1993);
JAMES TULLY, STRANGE MULTIPLICITY: CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AN AGE OF DIVERSITY 7, 191
(1995); ROBERT K. VISCHER, CONSCIENCE AND THE COMMON GOOD: RECLAIMING THE SPACE
BETWEEN PERSON AND STATE 103, 304 (2010).
17 RONALD DWORKIN, RELIGION WITHOUT GOD (2013).
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religious accommodation case, Hobby Lobby,18 admiring its concern for such
accommodation but critiquing its treatment of whether the law in question
places a substantial burden on religious practice. Before concluding, I offer
some brief thoughts on whether we should exempt from anti-discrimination
law small business owners who object on religious grounds to providing
services to same-sex couples in the setting of weddings or other commitment
ceremonies.
I. AGAINST THE MIDDLE GROUND:
TELEOLOGY FROM THEISTS AND ATHEISTS
Three modern works of western intellectual history display nicely the
way that thinking about proper human ends, i.e., teleological thinking, can
be done by both religious and anti-religious folk, and how value pluralism
has to fight off attacks from both sides. The point of this discussion is to help
advance my claim that both as a matter of political theory and as a matter of
domestic constitutional law, the proper political (though not necessarily per-
sonal) position on truth is an open-ended agnosticism, and neither a classical
nor post-Enlightenment sureness.
In After Virtue, Alasdair MacIntyre critiques modern societies for lack-
ing the shared grounding for the kinds of moral claims that such societies
nonetheless still make.19 And he constructs a case for understanding human
ends in a classical, virtue-based way, that although drawn from the specifics
of one’s time and place nonetheless transcend such localism. Although he
critiques modernism for its pluralism, his more interesting critique is of
modernists who are not pluralists, who share his desire for finding right an-
swers no matter one’s culture, but who lack (he claims) the ability to ground
such answers.
MacIntyre’s constructive piece canvasses conceptions of virtue through
Homer, Plato, Aristotle, and others. He develops a context-based theory of
virtue while resisting the charge of pluralism or relativism this might entail.
Regarding Homeric depictions, MacIntyre says that “morality and social
structure are in fact one and the same in heroic society . . . Morality as
something distinct does not yet exist. Evaluative questions are questions of
social fact.”20 Moving on to Athens and Plato, MacIntyre claims the Greeks
“[took] it for granted that the milieu in which the virtues are to be exercised
and in terms of which they are to be defined is the polis . . . Plato’s account
of the virtuous man is inseparable from his account of the virtuous citi-
zen.”21 This point is about both the political nature of man and the situated-
ness of virtue. And for Aristotle, in a given community, we judge based on a
18 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
19 See generally ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE (3d ed. 2007).
20 Id. at 123.
21 Id. at 135, 141.
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“wide range of agreement in that community on goods and virtues,” i.e., a
“shared recognition of and pursuit of a good.”22 After developing the con-
ception of a “practice,” MacIntyre offers a provisional definition of virtue:
“A virtue is an acquired human quality the possession and exercise of which
tends to enable us to achieve those goods which are internal to practices and
the lack of which effectively prevents us from achieving any such goods.”23
So there is no separating our proper human ends—what is good and
virtuous—from our specific practices; no use, that is, trying to be de-contex-
tualized modern-day rationalists. “I can only answer the question ‘What am
I to do?’ if I can answer the prior question ‘Of what story or stories do I find
myself a part?’” 24 But, according to MacIntyre: (a) There are still right
answers:
An Aristotelian theory of the virtues . . . presuppose[s] a cru-
cial distinction between what any particular individual at any par-
ticular time takes to be good for him and what is really good for
him as a man. It is for the sake of achieving this latter good that
we practice the virtues.25
Our situatedness doesn’t “entail that the self has to accept the moral
limitations of the particularity of those forms of community.”26 “[T]here
may be better or worse ways for individuals to live through the tragic con-
frontation of good with good.”27 (b) That proper human ends are located
through specific practices entails neither relativism nor pluralism. Even
without a modern notion of neutral standards, “it is possible for one . . .
tradition to defeat another in respect of the adequacy of its claims to truth
and to rational justification.”28 MacIntyre expounds on this in the Postscript
to the Second Edition by saying that a moral understanding may:
successfully transcend[ ] the limitations of its predecessors and in
so doing provide[ ] the best means available for understanding
those predecessors . . . [W]e have the best possible reason to have
confidence that future challenges will also be met successfully,
that the principles which define the core of a moral scheme are
enduring principles.29
MacIntyre’s critique is primarily posed as a (supposed) paradox:
[O]n the one hand [current positions on morality] seem to pre-
suppose a reference to some shared impersonal standard in virtue
of which at most one of those contending parties can be in the
22 Id. at 155.
23 Id. at 191 (emphasis omitted).
24 Id. at 216.
25 Id. at 150.
26 Id. at 221.
27 Id. at 224.
28 Id. at xiii.
29 Id. at 270.
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right, and yet on the other the poverty of the arguments adduced in
support of their assertions . . . suggest strongly that there is no
such standard.30
That is, he critiques the post-Enlightenment attempt to provide a ra-
tional justification of morality independent of a teleological foundation of
the classical sort (such as God).31 “The project of providing a rational vindi-
cation of morality ha[s] decisively failed . . . . In a world of secular rational-
ity religion could no longer provide such a shared background and
foundation for moral discourse and action.”32 And then philosophy failed at
this too.33 MacIntyre describes the modern predicament starkly:
[T]he price paid for liberation from what appeared to be the exter-
nal authority of traditional morality was the loss of any authorita-
tive content from the would-be moral utterances of the newly
autonomous agent. Each moral agent now spoke unconstrained by
the externalities of divine law, natural teleology or hierarchical au-
thority; but why should anyone else now listen to him?34
Charles Taylor’s rich and rewarding Sources of the Self is a “history of
the modern identity,” i.e., “what it is to be a human agent: the senses of
inwardness, freedom, individuality, and being embedded in nature which are
at home in the modern West.”35 He concludes that “this [modern] identity is
much richer in moral sources than its condemners allow, but that this rich-
ness is rendered invisible by the impoverished philosophical language of its
most zealous defenders.”36 This is similar to MacIntyre’s “paradox” point.37
Also similarly to MacIntyre, Taylor discusses the necessary frameworks and
baselines for moral understanding, while simultaneously developing an ac-
count of morality that requires “intrinsic description,” criteria independent
of facts, and a “best account” of our actual moral practice.38 Such an ac-
count works from located specifics to our best conclusions about what is
really the case morally, not just what may be locally or contingently the
case. In the end, as does MacIntyre, Taylor bemoans the loss of a theistic
anchor.
Taylor argues that “[f]rameworks provide the background, explicit or
implicit, for our moral judgments, intuitions, or reactions in any of . . . three
dimensions.”39 He defends the “strong thesis that doing without frameworks
30 Id. at ix.
31 See id. at 39.
32 Id. at 50.
33 See id.
34 Id. at 68.
35 CHARLES TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF: THE MAKING OF MODERN IDENTITY, at ix
(1989).
36 Id. at x–xi.
37 See id. at 339.
38 See id. at 5–8, 58, 71–74.
39 Id. at 26.
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is utterly impossible for us.”40 Our sense of self is linked to moral terms;41
and it too is ineluctably contextualized/socialized.42 But right answers cannot
be located just in local practice. Instead, Taylor insists that we take “intrinsic
description seriously, that is, descriptions of the objects of our moral re-
sponses whose criteria are independent of our de facto reactions.”43 Taylor
writes that questions of how we should deal with others and questions about
our own dignity (and development of a full life) are linked:44 “[T]hey all
involve . . . ‘strong evaluation,’ that is, they involve discriminations of right
or wrong, better or worse, higher or lower, which are not rendered valid by
our own desires, inclinations, or choices, but rather stand independent of
these and offer standards by which they can be judged.”45 Our best account
of our moral practices works from the inside, the inside of our lived experi-
ence and reasoned conclusions from that experience. Just as we develop a
sense of truth in the sciences, “[t]here is no reason to proceed differently in
the domain of human affairs.”46 “There cannot be [relevant moral] consid-
erations . . . outside the perspectives in dispute and which would neverthe-
less be decisive.”47 “[W]hat metaconsiderations can overrule our best
account of our actual moral experience?”48
This is neither relativism nor pluralism, but what one might call
grounded realism. It is an attractive position—one I share—but it does not
require, politically or constitutionally, the kind of firmness of interpretive
moral conclusion that we might otherwise reach according to this best ac-
count. There are good reasons to have a more agnostic view about what is
right in a complex multi-cultural and multi-religious society, even if one
believes that Taylor’s moral realism is correct.49
Much of Taylor’s book is an intellectual history of the development of
the modern mind and sense of self, the movement away from classical teleo-
logical sources and away from related conceptions of authority. Thus, he
discusses the move toward locating authority in the self, from Augustine to
Descartes to Locke to Montaigne. Locke is crucial here; he “rejected any
form of the doctrine of innate ideas”;50 his thinking was anti-teleological
regarding both knowledge and morality. From Locke and Descartes we get
the “essential opposition to authority of modern disengaged reason.”51 They
(and followers) ask us “to think it out ourselves.”52 Ordinary life becomes a
40 Id. at 27.
41 See id. at 3, 32.
42 See id. at 36–40.
43 Id. at 7. This is similar to Ronald Dworkin’s understanding of interpretation. See gener-
ally RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS, pt. 2 (2011).
44 Dworkin’s work is also similar in this respect. See DWORKIN, supra note 43, at ch. 9. R
45 TAYLOR, supra note 35, at 4. R
46 Id. at 69.
47 Id. at 73.
48 Id. at 99.
49 See MOON, supra note 16, at 54, 103; VISCHER, supra note 16, at 86. R
50 TAYLOR, supra note 35, at 164. R
51 Id. at 167.
52 Id.
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focus.53 As does MacIntyre, Taylor discusses the move away from classical
and in particular theistic sources of morality. We have moved from God as
the source of morals to “moral sources” as “ontologically diverse.”54 And in
a normative rather than descriptive mode, Taylor bemoans this. He claims
that the best explanation of the significance of human life involves a God.55
He writes that as “great as the power of naturalist sources might be, the
potential of a certain theistic perspective is incomparably greater.”56 And he
says that “adopting a stripped-down secular outlook . . . involves stifling the
response in us to some of the deepest and most powerful spiritual aspirations
that humans have conceived. This . . . is a heavy price to pay.”57
So despite their rich descriptive intellectual histories of the develop-
ment of the modern mind, MacIntyre and Taylor ultimately hold out hope for
a return to some kind of theistic or otherwise classical notion of how to do
and be good. By contrast, consider Anthony Pagden’s recent celebration of a
different notion of who we are and how we can best locate doing and being
good. His book The Enlightenment is primarily an easily accessible, enjoya-
ble intellectual history of the development of Enlightenment and post-En-
lightenment thinking.58 But his normative position is very much on display
as well. His is an argument for a cosmopolitan, universal human rights un-
derstanding of morality, ungrounded by God, and with little room for cul-
tural or any other kind of pluralism. It stands, thus, in illustrative contrast to
After Virtue and Sources of the Self. All three books are impressive can-
vasses of Western thought and the development from classical to modern
approaches, but while MacIntyre and Taylor stress the need to return to or at
least accept theism as a ground for morals, Pagden heads in the opposite
direction.
Pagden explains that at the core of the Enlightenment was an “exalted
view of human rationality and of human benevolence, and with a belief,
measured and at times skeptical, in progress and in the general human capac-
ity for self-improvement.”59 Enlightenment (and post-Enlightenment) think-
ers also stressed individual autonomy and are the “source of most modern
liberal, tolerant, undogmatic, and secular understandings of politics and
[serve] as the intellectual origins of all modern forms of universalism.”60
Pagden leaves little doubt throughout the book that “the Enlightenment was
profoundly anti-religious.”61
Pagden at times nods toward those in the Enlightenment who broad-
ened their horizons from Europe to other lands, and began understanding
53 See id. at pt. 2.
54 Id. at 401.
55 See id. at 342.
56 Id. at 518.
57 Id. at 520.
58 See generally ANTHONY PAGDEN, THE ENLIGHTENMENT: AND WHY IT STILL MATTERS
(2013).
59 Id. at x.
60 Id.
61 Id. at xiv.
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“difference as well as similitude.”62 Some thinkers were what we might call
experts in comparative studies; for them, “[t]he purpose of the ‘human sci-
ences’ was to know mankind as a species, and the best way to do that was
through a detailed examination of their ‘manners,’ ‘customs,’ ‘moeurs.’” 63
For example, Pagden discusses some of the Enlightenment’s interest in Tahiti
and China.64
But Pagden’s interest in cultural difference—his and the Enlightenment
thinkers he describes—is ultimately not about defending normative plural-
ism. Rather, the single most important Enlightenment claim was for a “sin-
gle global community—a ‘cosmopolis.’” 65 This is perhaps Pagden’s main
theme, the one he seems most interested in developing in the book. Enlight-
enment thinkers wanted to recover a vision “of a unified and essentially
benign humanity, of a potentially cosmopolitan world,”66 without theism.
We share a common identity with each other (just as humans); if we appreci-
ate our love for relatives and others close to us because we identify with
them, then we should take the next steps to ever broader circles of affinity,
with all persons.67 The concept of mutual recognition is key here.68 Montes-
quieu and Diderot rephrased an old idea: “an image of concentric circles,
which moved steadily outward from the individual and the family to the
homeland or the patria, until finally they reached the whole of humanity.”69
This “was an image repeated . . . by virtually all of the thinkers of the En-
lightenment.”70 We can understand “humankind [as having] an identity in-
dependent of God, a reason for recognizing all peoples as of equal worth,
and of embracing some kind of common good, without endowing them with
immortal souls or thinking of them as pale, if identical, images of the
divine.”71
Pagden develops this concept of cosmopolitan recognition in various
ways. One is how thinkers transformed observations about what we might
call ‘third-world’ places into understanding our ultimate human similarities
and ways of binding us together. Thus, describing Diderot on Tahiti: “It is
the image of a people at the very beginning of the process that will carry
them inexorably toward civilization.”72 And he describes Wolff and Vattel
searching for “a scientifically grounded set of premises for a universal law
on which all reasonable, rational human beings could agree, no matter what
their religious beliefs or national allegiances might be.”73 Another angle on
cosmopolitan recognition as a theme is Pagden’s discussion of the develop-
62 Id. at 22.
63 Id. at 178.
64 See id. at ch. 5, 6, 8.
65 Id. at 44.
66 Id. at 66.
67 See id. at 74.
68 See id.
69 Id. at 293–94.
70 Id. at 294.
71 Id. at 94.
72 Id. at 242.
73 Id. at 340.
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ing understanding of commerce as something to bind together different peo-
ples.74 The apotheosis of this focus on mutual recognition among all humans
and the development of a cosmopolitan approach was Kant’s Toward Perpet-
ual Peace, a Philosophical Project, which Pagden discusses in detail.75 In
short, for Kant, nations of the world (which should be republics) should bind
together into a kind of league, fulfilling humanity’s correlative cosmopolitan
right/obligation.76 Kant’s notion of “cosmopolitan right,” says Pagden, was
“the inescapable conclusion of the Enlightenment project.”77
In the end, Pagden applauds the anti-theistic bent of Enlightenment
thinking, celebrating the turn toward individual autonomy and reason, which
can bind us together regardless of religion, culture, race, etc.78 As for the
anti-theism, philosophers and scientists of the 17th century “marginaliz[ed]
theology,” and thereby “undermined the idea that there could exist one sin-
gle source of knowledge or one single source of authority.”79 Pagden sum-
marizes the classical to modern move: The polis is no longer the “fulfillment
of an a priori plan on the part of nature (or the divinity).”80 Now it is “noth-
ing more than a rational calculation intended to ensure the continuation of
the species.”81 Summarizing many thinkers, Pagden explains that “[t]he
claims of Hume and Diderot, of D’Alembert and Voltaire, of Helvetius,
Holbach, and Condorcet . . . had effectively discredited the idea that any
kind of religious understanding might prove a true source of knowledge.”82
Pagden’s focus on the anti-theism of the Enlightenment is a tamer and
more descriptive version of claims made in a more vigorously normative
fashion by such contemporary thinkers as Richard Dawkins, Daniel Dennett,
Sam Harris, and Brian Leiter.83 All of these authors are concerned about
religious claims made without the kind of evidence we insist on when doing
science.84 Thus, Leiter writes:
If what distinguishes religious beliefs from other important and
meaningful beliefs held by individuals is that religious beliefs are
both insulated from evidence and issue in categorical demands for
action, then isn’t there reason to worry that religious beliefs, as
74 See id. at 255–62.
75 See id. at 347–64.
76 See id.
77 Id. at 370.
78 See id. at 406–08, 415.
79 Id. at 32. Should we not, though, be concerned about reliance on a “single source of
authority” when celebrating the possibility of human reason discovering true answers to moral
questions, answers that may then apparently be followed across the globe?
80 Id. at 62.
81 Id.
82 Id. at 148.
83 See generally RICHARD DAWKINS, THE GOD DELUSION (2006); DANIEL C. DENNETT,
BREAKING THE SPELL: RELIGION AS A NATURAL PHENOMENON (2006); SAM HARRIS, THE END
OF FAITH: RELIGION, TERROR, AND THE FUTURE OF REASON (2004); BRIAN LEITER, WHY TOL-
ERATE RELIGION? (2013).
84 See also CHRISTOPHER HITCHENS, GOD IS NOT GREAT: HOW RELIGION POISONS EVERY-
THING 5 (2009).
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against other matters of conscience, are far more likely to cause
harms and infringe on liberty?85
Harris says we should make “the same evidentiary demands in relig-
ious matters that we make in all others.”86 Dawkins argues that we should
not be forever agnostic about God’s existence, because we can evaluate that
case with evidence;87 he also rejects the argument for not applying standard
rules of evidence to the question of God’s existence.88 (The upshot for
Dawkins: “There Almost Certainly Is No God.”)89 Dennett also critiques
some religious beliefs for failing to comply with scientific standards of in-
quiry.90 But as Alvin Plantinga maintains, one can be a good person of sci-
ence, including acceptance of evolutionary theory, and still believe in a
divine force behind all of it, in a generative and/or normative sense.91 Says
Thomas Nagel, “If the God hypothesis makes sense at all, it offers a differ-
ent kind of explanation from those of physical science . . . .”92 One can, that
is, see evidence-based scientific inquiry and theistic belief or faith as ex-
isting on different planes.93 A comprehensive pluralism would make space
for a faith-based way of knowing, so long as action in that space does not
significantly harm others.94
II. RONALD DWORKIN’S RELIGION WITHOUT GOD
Whether morality and the good as substance—how to be and what to
be, one might say—are properly grounded in a perhaps difficult but knowa-
ble set of truths—from God or right reason or otherwise—is not something I
can answer here or on which I need take a position. I have tried to show that
many modern thinkers share an important quality even as they divide: the
quality of wanting some kind of sure grounding for how we should live both
toward others and ourselves. Whether this grounding is in God or in an ef-
85 LEITER, supra note 83, at 59. R
86 HARRIS, supra note 83, at 35. R
87 See DAWKINS, supra note 83, at 70, 91. R
88 See id. at ch. 4.
89 Id. at 137.
90 See DENNETT, supra note 83, at 267–68. R
91 See ALVIN PLANTINGA, WHERE THE CONFLICT REALLY LIES: SCIENCE, RELIGION, &
NATURALISM 38, 63 (2011). See also DANIEL C. DENNETT & ALVIN PLANTINGA, SCIENCE AND
RELIGION: ARE THEY COMPATIBLE? 2–4, 9, 65–66 (2011).
92 THOMAS NAGEL, SECULAR PHILOSOPHY AND THE RELIGIOUS TEMPERAMENT: ESSAYS
2002–2008 at 22 (2010).
93 See Abner S. Greene, Religion and Theistic Faith: On Koppelman, Leiter, Secular Pur-
pose, and Accommodations, 49 TULSA L. REV. 441, 441, 445–48, 455–56 (2013) (reviewing
LEITER, supra note 83, and ANDREW KOPPELMAN, DEFENDING AMERICAN RELIGIOUS NEU- R
TRALITY (2013)); Michael W. McConnell, Why Protect Religious Freedom?, 123 YALE L.J.
770, 788 (2013) (reviewing LEITER, supra note 83); Michael Stokes Paulsen, Is Religious R
Freedom Irrational?, 112 MICH. L. REV. 1043, 1063 n.44 (2014) (reviewing LEITER, supra
note 83). R
94 Some religious belief may be based in evidence; here I am just saying it need not be and
for many it is not. See McConnell, supra note 93, at 786–87; Paulsen, supra note 93, at 1060, R
1061 n.39.
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fort to use human reason without theism, the ideas are teleological, i.e., un-
derstanding human beings as having knowable ends that do not differ in
their essentials. My approach, in this piece and elsewhere, has been to show
that neither works politically or constitutionally; rather, agnosticism regard-
ing value follows from a rejection of political obligation (and legitimacy)
and from a more affirmative case for value pluralism.
Thus, I support accommodations/exemptions, even more broadly than
religion,95 but let’s focus on religious ones. RFRA is sensible, if applied sen-
sibly. Before turning to my thoughts on RFRA as refracted through Hobby
Lobby, first a pause to discuss Ronald Dworkin on exemptions. Dworkin is
the latest in a series of scholars to reject the case for religious accommoda-
tion.96 In his final work, Religion Without God,97 Dworkin advances a char-
acteristically provocative and complex thesis. I will first describe his basic
argument, then offer a few thoughts on his definition of religion (“without
God”), and then turn to his case against religious accommodation. His argu-
ments are no more persuasive than those offered by scholars who preceded
him along this path.
Dworkin contends that religion is “deeper than God.”98 It is a “deep,
distinct, and comprehensive worldview: it holds that inherent, objective
value permeates everything.”99 Theism is just one possible manifestation or
consequence of this worldview.100 Key to Dworkin’s argument is a Humeian
commitment to a fact-value distinction. Moreover, Dworkin is an un-
grounded realist; values and moral truths are real, and not grounded in any-
thing further.101 We know them through experience, reason, and intuition, not
through some external authority. There is, thus, an element of faith behind
science, math, and religion (understood broadly); “we accept felt, ines-
capable conviction rather than the benediction of some independent means
of verification.”102 According to Dworkin, the core problem with under-
standing religion as theistic, as God-based (or, as I have put it elsewhere, as
involving reliance on an “extrahuman source of normative authority”103), is
that it mixes up cause and effect, i.e., it improperly assumes there can be a
God who (or that) grounds value, rather than the other way around. “The
95 For a broad-reaching argument for accommodation of cultural diversity, see TULLY,
supra note 16, at 30. R
96 See generally BRIAN BARRY, CULTURE AND EQUALITY: AN EGALITARIAN CRITIQUE OF
MULTICULTURALISM (2001); LEITER, supra note 83; Philip B. Kurland, Of Church and State R
and the Supreme Court, 29 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1961); William P. Marshall, In Defense of Smith
and Free Exercise Revisionism, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 308 (1991) (arguing against compelled
exemptions).
97 DWORKIN, supra note 17. R
98 Id. at 1.
99 Id.
100 Dworkin’s arguments about a comprehensive unity of value are a short version of the
case he makes at length in his magisterial Justice for Hedgehogs. See DWORKIN, supra note 43. R
101 See DWORKIN, supra note 17, at 15. R
102 Id. at 19.
103 See GREENE, supra note 12, at 150. R
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conviction that a god underwrites value . . . presupposes a prior commitment
to the independent reality of that value,”104 claims Dworkin, adding that the
“value part does not depend—cannot depend—on any god’s existence or
history.”105 In other words:
Theists assume that their value realism is grounded realism. God,
they think, has provided and certifies their perception of value: of
the responsibilities of life and the wonders of the universe. In fact,
however, their realism must finally be ungrounded. It is the radical
independence of value from history, including divine history, that
makes their faith defensible.106
I have three responses. First, Dworkin’s approach is not a very good
interpretation of religion in our constitutional culture. Religion in America is
primarily about theism, about faith in God and what follows from that, about
reliance on an extrahuman source of normative authority in various ways,
some problematic (if used as the express, predominant source of binding
law), some in need of assistance (if harmed by state discrimination or even
by neutral laws of general applicability).
Second, it’s not clear why Dworkin needs to assimilate the concepts of
value and religion. His theory of value is complex and capacious; it’s never
clear why he feels the need to describe the fact (if it is one) that “inherent,
objective value permeates everything”107 as a religious attitude.
Third, I would suspect that many religious folk (I myself am agnostic)
take it on faith (and perhaps reason from evidence) that God comes first,
value second. Whether and how such value is knowable could still be a com-
plex question, and one could still be a values and morals realist without
being an ungrounded one. That is, one could believe that value and moral
norms are just the case; that it is up to us with our admittedly limited powers
to figure out right answers; that most of this comes from experience, reason,
and intuition; but that there is an extrahuman source of normative (and prob-
ably creative) authority behind all of it. There’s nothing inherently contradic-
tory about this. One may believe in the relationship between fact and value
in this way (the fact of God’s existence grounding value), but reject a differ-
ent assertion of a fact-value relationship, i.e., a more classical teleological
understanding that culture- and community-specific practices determine
value and morality. That notion—that because things have been a certain
way, that way is good and valuable—has nothing to do with the belief that
God came first, value second.
With an expansive definition of religion in hand, Dworkin rejects any
special protection for religious freedom. Rather, political liberty should rec-
ognize a right to what Dworkin calls “ethical independence,”108 i.e., “gov-
104 DWORKIN, supra note 17, at 1–2. R
105 Id. at 9.
106 Id. at 22.
107 Id. at 1.
108 Id. at 131.
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ernment must never restrict freedom just because it assumes that one way for
people to live their lives . . . is intrinsically better than another . . . .”109
Dworkin explains the difference between protecting religious freedom spe-
cially and his ethical independence approach, which focuses on policing a
government’s reasons for regulation:110
We should consider . . . abandoning the idea of a special right to
religious freedom with its high hurdle of protection and therefore
its compelling need for strict limits and careful definition. We
should consider instead applying, to the traditional subject matter
of that supposed right, only the more general right of ethical inde-
pendence. The difference between these two approaches is impor-
tant. A special right fixes attention on the subject matter in
question: a special right of religion declares that government may
not constrain religious exercise in any way, absent an extraordi-
nary emergency. The general right to ethical independence, on the
contrary, fixes on the relation between government and citizens: it
limits the reasons government may offer for any constraint on a
citizen’s freedom at all.111
My response is twofold. (a) As with Dworkin’s unusual definition of
religion that insists on assimilating it to his broader concept of value, here
too Dworkin unusually seeks to assimilate protection for religious freedom
to something else, i.e., limits on the state’s ability to treat us as children. (b)
There are two more specific claims that Dworkin makes in critiquing a more
standard approach to religious accommodations that are mistaken.
(a) I agree that the state should not regulate in ways that deprive us of
our ethical independence, i.e., that belittle our efforts at shaping the good life
and that insist on the superiority of certain ways of living.112 But we can, and
have, built some bulwarks against this bad kind of state intrusion into dig-
nity. I am thinking of our (sometimes maligned) substantive due process
jurisprudence113 and our (also sometimes maligned) rule against laws based
109 Id. at 130.
110 See id. at 131.
111 Id. at 132–33.
112 By contrast, I support a thick perfectionism when it comes to state speech as opposed
to state regulation. The state often does, appropriately, use purse strings and other non-coercive
methods to advance often contested views of the good. See generally Abner S. Greene, Gov-
ernment Endorsement: A Reply to Nelson Tebbe’s Government Nonendorsement, 98 MINN. L.
REV. HEADNOTES 87 (2013); Abner S. Greene, State Speech and Political Liberalism, 28
CONST. COMMENT. 421 (2013) (reviewing COREY BRETTSCHNEIDER, WHEN THE STATE
SPEAKS, WHAT SHOULD IT SAY? HOW DEMOCRACIES CAN PROTECT EXPRESSION AND PRO-
MOTE EQUALITY (2012), and JAMES E. FLEMING AND LINDA C. MCCLAIN, ORDERED LIBERTY:
RIGHTS, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND VIRTUES (2013)); Abner S. Greene, Government Speech on
Unsettled Issues, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1667 (2001); Abner S. Greene, Government of the
Good, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1 (2000).
113 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833 (1992); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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on express, predominant religious purpose.114 These lines of case law ex-
amine the reasons for state action and reject those that either treat a person’s
body as the state’s or would ground general regulation in express, contested,
sectarian religious views. We don’t need to displace what might otherwise be
a valid protection for religious freedom to gain protection against violation
of ethical independence.
(b) Dworkin doesn’t believe there is an otherwise valid protection for
religious freedom. But his critical commentary on religious accommodations
is flawed.115 First, Dworkin says that to administer a scheme of religious
accommodations, we would “seem to have no firm way of excluding even
the wildest ethical eccentricity from the category of protected faith.”116 This
problem is made worse by Dworkin’s expansive definition of religion, but is
arguably present even with a more standard definition. However, it’s really
not such a problem. Although courts don’t question the content of religious
beliefs, there is room to assure sincerity. We could let judges use normal
standards of evidence to see if people have the kind of deeply held beliefs in
life’s objective, intrinsic meaning and nature’s objective, intrinsic value,117
just as we let judges use normal standards of evidence to test the sincerity of
a claim of theistic religious belief.
Second, Dworkin claims that in a scheme of religious accommodation,
“an exemption for one faith from a constraint imposed on people of other
faiths discriminates against those other faiths on religious grounds.”118 This
isn’t right.119 Careful case by case assessment of the substantiality of the
burden on religious exercise and the ability to craft carve-outs without sig-
nificant harm to others (i.e., does the state really need uniform enforcement
of this law, in this case?) will indeed lead to some accommodation claimants
winning and others losing. But this is no different from litigation under any
complex legal test, and if properly explained in comparison to winners,
losers should not see their losses as discrimination.120
114 See McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 881 (2005); Edwards v. Aguillard,
482 U.S. 578, 596–97 (1987); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 61 (1985); Epperson v. Arkan-
sas, 393 U.S. 97, 113 (1968).
115 Although most of Dworkin’s discussion clearly resists any special right to religious
accommodation, he does also say this: “If an exception can be managed with no significant
damage to the policy in play, then it might be unreasonable not to grant that exception.”
DWORKIN, supra note 17, at 136. R
116 Id. at 124.
117 See id. at 11.
118 Id. at 125.
119 See, e.g., Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 519–22 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing) (contending that case by case judicial inquiry can properly distinguish practices deserving
exemption from those not so deserving).
120 Why Dworkin would think this kind of scheme would lead to discrimination against
the losers “on religious grounds,” DWORKIN, supra note 17, at 125, is a mystery, unless the R
court or legislature crafting the accommodation was in fact making the judgment according to
the prevailing religion’s view of truth, and then that would be wrong.
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III. THE VALUE OF RFRA, AND THE MISTAKE OF HOBBY LOBBY
A little background before getting into my critique of Hobby Lobby:
From 1963 to 1990, the Court said it was applying strict scrutiny to state
action that incidentally imposed substantial burdens on religious exercise.
As many have pointed out, this strict scrutiny was different from strict scru-
tiny in Equal Protection Clause race cases, where strict really means strict.
In the Free Exercise Clause setting, the government pretty much always pre-
vailed, making the scrutiny not really strict.121 With the peyote decision,
Smith,122 the Court finally stated it would not apply strict scrutiny to neutral
laws of general applicability that substantially burden religious exercise.123
The Court has not overruled Smith, but in response to that decision,
Congress enacted RFRA, which purports to “restore the compelling interest
test as set forth in Sherbert . . . and Yoder.” 124 Under RFRA, government
“shall not substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion even if the
burden results from a rule of general applicability,”125 unless it can show that
applying the law to the person is the least restrictive means to further a
compelling government interest.126 Because of federalism reasons, however,
in City of Boerne127 the Court invalidated RFRA as it applies to state and
local governments.
But RFRA stands as applied to the federal government, and in O Centro
Espirita, a unanimous Court easily concluded that a small religious group
deserved a RFRA exemption from federal drug laws for an otherwise pros-
cribable hallucinogenic tea.128 Chief Justice Roberts’ opinion made clear that
once a RFRA claimant shows a substantial burden on religious exercise, for
the federal government to prevail on rebuttal, it must show strong reasons
for applying the law to the claimant. That the government grants similar
accommodations elsewhere, and that the risk of diversion of the controlled
substance is low, undercut the government’s rebuttal. Justice Blackmun had
made virtually identical points in his Smith opinion, which supported a con-
121 For the exceptions, when the state lost, see Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals
Comm’n, 480 U.S. 136 (1987); Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981); Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
122 Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
123 Justice Scalia’s opinion for the Court was somewhat inaccurate in describing the prior
case law, in particular, in failing to see Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), as a strong
holding for a constitutionally compelled Free Exercise Clause exemption from an otherwise
valid law. Describing Yoder as a case about hybrid rights, see 494 U.S. at 881, misses the clear
Free Exercise Clause basis for the holding.
124 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1) (2009). See also 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(5) (2009) (“[T]he
compelling interest test as set forth in prior Federal court rulings is a workable test for striking
sensible balances between religious liberty and competing prior governmental interests”).
125 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb–1(a) (2009).
126 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb–1(b) (2009).
127 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). For a discussion of the separation of
powers aspects of the holding, see GREENE, supra note 12, at 236–39. R
128 Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao Do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 419
(2006).
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLP\9-1\HLP101.txt unknown Seq: 18  4-MAR-15 13:58
178 Harvard Law & Policy Review [Vol. 9
stitutionally compelled exemption to Oregon’s controlled substances laws for
the Native American Church’s ritual religious use of the hallucinogenic drug
peyote.129 But that opinion was a dissent. Not only could the Court not mus-
ter a majority for this approach in Smith, it is hard to imagine it mustering a
majority for this approach pre-Smith. The pre-Smith case law was much
more government-favorable. At least from the easy, unanimous O Centro
Espirita opinion, it seems that RFRA did not just restore the kind of weak
strict scrutiny that prevailed pre-Smith. It ushered in a regime that is more
protective of religious freedom, appropriately supporting pluralism, balanc-
ing of interests, and hesitation about the government’s claims on universal,
uniform obedience to law.
How much more protective is a key question in Hobby Lobby.130 The
Court addressed whether privately held corporations should receive an ex-
emption, under RFRA, from a Department of Health and Human Services
(HHS) regulation implementing the Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act.131 (I will refer to the combination of the statute and regulation as
“Obamacare.”) Under the law and regulation, most corporations must pro-
vide group health insurance for their employees, coverage which includes
contraception.132 Some religious employers, such as Hobby Lobby, claim
that some forms of Obamacare-covered contraception may produce abor-
tions. These employers say providing health-care coverage in this way vio-
lates their religious beliefs and substantially burdens their exercise of
religion.133 Under Smith, Hobby Lobby would lose a Free Exercise Clause
challenge, because the Obamacare law and regulations are neutral rules of
general applicability, i.e., they do not target religion, although they may af-
fect religious practice. Smith requires only a rational basis test in such set-
tings, and here the federal government has a rational basis for insisting that
Hobby Lobby, along with other corporations, cover the cost of the birth con-
trol in question. But under RFRA, Hobby Lobby stated a plausible claim of
a substantial burden on its religious exercise (although as I shall discuss in
detail, this claim should have failed), and the statute then puts the federal
government to the compelling interest/least restrictive means test.
I will not address three key aspects of Justice Alito’s majority opinion.
The first is whether a corporation such as Hobby Lobby is a “person” under
129 See Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 907–21 (1990) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
130 See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). I am skirting here,
and elsewhere in this article, the complex statutory interpretive question regarding precisely if
and how RFRA grants protection for religious exercise greater than under the Free Exercise
Clause as interpreted prior to Smith. The core of my discussion is about the substantial burden
test, rather than about what constitutes a compelling government interest or least restrictive
means, and there’s no reason to think what constitutes a substantial burden on religious exer-
cise varies between the RFRA setting and the Free Exercise Clause setting (before or after
Smith).
131 Id. at 2759.
132 For relevant statutory and regulatory background, see generally id. at 2760–64; id. at
2788–90, 2791–93 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
133 See id. at 2755.
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RFRA.134 The second is the relevance of RFRA’s incorporation of the Relig-
ious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act’s definition of religious ex-
ercise, to include “any exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or
central to, a system of religious belief.”135 The third is the linchpin of the
holding—that the federal government can ensure that Hobby Lobby’s female
employees get Obamacare-covered birth control free of charge, without
Hobby Lobby having to pay for it. The way the government can do this,
insists Alito,136 is to treat the for-profit Hobby Lobby as if it were a religious
nonprofit (such as a religious hospital or school), permitted under the statute
to certify its objection to paying for the birth control in question to the insur-
ance carrier or third-party administrator.137 The carrier or administrator then
provides the birth control, cost-free not only to the employees but also to the
religiously objecting employer. This is a more judicially creative use of the
least-restrictive means test in the religious freedom setting than we’ve seen
before. I leave it to others to assess its validity.
I am interested here in Justice Alito’s discussion, in Part IV of his opin-
ion, of this question: Does the requirement that Hobby Lobby pay for group
health insurance that includes some birth control methods it deems relig-
iously objectionable constitute a substantial burden on the corporation’s re-
ligious exercise? Hobby Lobby’s owners argued that some of the
Obamacare-covered birth control might terminate human life after concep-
tion, and as such is religiously objectionable to them.138 But RFRA does not
grant a prima facie exemption (subject to government rebuttal) for sincerely
held religious beliefs. It grants such an exemption if the law substantially
burdens a claimant’s religious exercise. One would think that this statutory
issue, as any statutory issue, is a subject for judicial interpretation, and that
courts would develop, case by case, a statutory interpretive understanding of
what constitutes a substantial burden on religious exercise.139 Thus, one
134 See id. at 2767–75; id. at 2793–97 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
135 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc–5(7)(A). See also 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-2(4). To make an obvi-
ous but perhaps needed point, this is a definition of religious exercise, and not of other portions
of RFRA (such as substantial burden, compelling interest, and least restrictive means).
136 See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2781–83.
137 Or maybe just certify its objection to HHS itself. See Wheaton College v. Burwell, 134
S. Ct. 2806, 2807 (2014) (order granting temporary injunction) (holding that: religious college
may certify objection to providing coverage for contraceptive services to HHS; circuits have
divided on the issue whether requiring religious nonprofits to certify their objections to the
insurance carriers or third-party administrators violates RFRA; and the order “should not be
construed as an expression of the Court’s views on the merits,” id. at 2807).
138 None of the opinions challenges the sincerity of that belief, although case law does
permit sincerity of religious belief to be judicially scrutinized. See Frazee v. Ill. Dep’t of Emp’t
Sec., 489 U.S. 829, 833 (1989).
139 Unless there is a special problem of religious liberty with this kind of judicial investi-
gation. Just as we properly understand the religion clauses to bar judicial inquiry into the truth
of religious belief, so perhaps we should understand the religion clauses to bar judicial inquiry
into the substantiality of a law’s burden on religious exercise. Justice Stevens said something
similar in a few opinions. See, e.g., Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 512–13 (1986)
(Stevens, J., concurring); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.2 (1982) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in the judgment). And near the end of her Hobby Lobby dissent, Justice Ginsburg
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would have expected Alito to engage in some analysis of the substantiality
of the burden on Hobby Lobby’s religious exercise, taking into account
Hobby Lobby’s views on the subject, but in no way deferring to such views.
But, alas, in Part IV.C, the majority opinion simply defers to Hobby
Lobby’s views, and thus fails to examine whether the law places a substan-
tial burden on Hobby Lobby’s religious exercise. I will get to this critical
problem with the majority opinion in a bit. Before doing so, I will discuss a
few earlier problems with Justice Alito’s analysis in Part IV. In Part IV.A,
Alito points out that the corporation’s owners “have a sincere religious belief
that life begins at conception,”140 and thus that the requirement that they pay
for health insurance coverage of the birth control in question “demands that
they engage in conduct that seriously violates their religious beliefs.”141 The
statute, however, refers to substantial burden on religious exercise, not be-
lief. This is not a big deal in the end. Hobby Lobby is obviously arguing that
having to pay for what it believes to be religiously forbidden is a burden on
its religious exercise. And Alito does at times refer properly to the burden as
being on religious exercise.142 But elsewhere his focus again is on whether
there is a burden on beliefs.143
Moving on to a more significant problem with the opinion, Justice Alito
points out that if Hobby Lobby fails to pay for its employees’ group health
insurance, it would have to pay a “substantial” amount of money as a tax.144
And at the end of Part IV.C, when concluding that the regulatory provision
in question places a substantial burden on Hobby Lobby’s religious beliefs,
Alito refers to the “enormous sum of money” Hobby Lobby would have to
pay if it didn’t cover the birth control in question.145 The price for disobeying
the law, though, can’t be what constitutes a substantial burden on religious
exercise, unless the claimant religiously objects to paying taxes (which the
Alito opinion, in dicta, says would not give claimant a RFRA exemption146).
The statutory question is whether state action has substantially burdened re-
ligious exercise; Hobby Lobby believes that paying for abortions is sinful,
and thus that complying fully with the Obamacare health care coverage re-
quirement substantially burdens its exercise of religion. The penalty (or tax)
for disobeying the law isn’t itself a substantial burden on religious exer-
sounds an alarm about this matter, as well. See 134 S. Ct. at 2805–06 (Ginsburg, J., dissent-
ing). If the religion clauses properly interpreted bar such inquiry, then we’d be stuck with a
tough question regarding RFRA—should we ask courts to ignore the threshold question of
substantial burden, and defer to a claimant’s view on the subject, or should the whole statute be
struck down as unconstitutional, on the ground that it asks courts to do something improper?
Although as I suggest below the Court deferred to Hobby Lobby on this issue, there’s no
indication that the Court thought the Constitution required it to do so.
140 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2775.
141 Id.
142 See, e.g., id. at 2775.
143 See id. at 2779.
144 See id. at 2776.
145 Id. at 2779.
146 See id. at 2783–84.
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cise—isn’t claimed to be, and isn’t. The in terrorem effect of such a penalty
or tax gives teeth to the operative legal burden to buy health insurance that
includes birth control coverage, but it cannot be the case that the amount of
the penalty or tax determines what constitutes a substantial burden on relig-
ious exercise. Otherwise, we might say that a statute imposing a nominal
penalty or tax (say, a dollar) doesn’t constitute a substantial burden on relig-
ious exercise, even though the operative legal burden does so. The proper
RFRA question is whether the legal demand to do X or to fail to do Y
substantially burdens the religious exercise in question, not whether the
threat of what will happen otherwise does so.
This was no different in the Free Exercise Clause unemployment com-
pensation cases, which arose in a different setting from Hobby Lobby. Those
cases involved laws that said ‘if you fail to accept work you are qualified to
do, you have to have a good reason, or else you can’t get unemployment
compensation.’ The key holding in each case was that the state must consider
good faith religious refusal to accept certain work a good reason, at least
when it is administering a fact- and case-specific regime of determining
good cause for work refusal.147 There’s no operative legal provision in those
cases telling the claimants to do or not to do something. State law didn’t
require Sherbert to work on her Sabbath.148 It didn’t substantially burden her
religious exercise in that way. Sherbert’s private employer required her to
work on her Sabbath,149 and that employer wasn’t subject to the Free Exer-
cise Clause of the First Amendment, which applies to state action only. If
there was a substantial burden from state action, it was because Sherbert was
faced with a serious threat if she failed to work on her Sabbath—no money
if the state denied her claim for unemployment compensation—and thus the
state’s administration of the unemployment compensation fund was properly
subject to Free Exercise Clause scrutiny. In the Hobby Lobby-type case—as
with most (all?) cases involving laws that are truly of general applicability—
there is a regulatory regime requiring X or forbidding Y. Regardless of the
substantiality of the penalty for failing to comply with such a regulatory
regime, claimants may make out a prima facie RFRA claim (and could have
made out a prima facie Free Exercise Claim pre-Smith) by showing the sub-
stantiality of the ‘do X’ or ‘don’t do Y’ burden on their religious exercise,
even if the ‘or else’ threat is a pittance. But if the ‘do X’ or ‘don’t do Y’
burden is legally insubstantial, it cannot become legally substantial just be-
cause the penalty for disobeying is high.
147 See Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n, 480 U.S. 136, 138–40 (1987);
Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 709–12, 719–20 (1981); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S.
398, 399–401, 403–06, 409 (1963).
148 See id. at 403.
149 See id. at 399.
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Thus, we should distinguish language in the unemployment compensa-
tion cases about what sort of state action creates a significant or substantial
burden on religious exercise. In Sherbert the Court wrote:
The ruling [denying Sherbert unemployment compensation]
forces her to choose between following the precepts of her religion
and forfeiting benefits, on the one hand, and abandoning one of the
precepts of her religion in order to accept work, on the other hand.
Governmental imposition of such a choice puts the same kind of
burden upon the free exercise of religion as would a fine imposed
against appellant for her Saturday worship.150
In Thomas the Court wrote:
Where the state conditions receipt of an important benefit upon
conduct proscribed by a religious faith, or where it denies such a
benefit because of conduct mandated by religious belief, thereby
putting substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior
and to violate his beliefs, a burden upon religion exists. While the
compulsion may be indirect, the infringement upon free exercise is
nonetheless substantial.151
So state action that places indirect pressure on religious exercise may
constitute a substantial burden, and one of my points (developed below) is
that the indirectness of the burden on Hobby Lobby should matter in deter-
mining whether the burden is substantial. One might thus argue that the
Court has already decided (in the Sherbert line of cases) that indirect bur-
dens on religious exercise may be substantial.
But remember my point from a few paragraphs ago. In the Sherbert line
of cases, other than the state’s role in granting or denying unemployment
compensation, there was no state action at all. In those cases, it’s as if the
state is saying to Sherbert, ‘work on your Sabbath, or else don’t get paid,’
and it’s as if the state is saying to Thomas, ‘produce armaments in violation
of your religious precepts, or else don’t get paid.’ The ‘or else’ in the Sherbert
line of cases is essential to the presence of state action, because otherwise
there is no initial ‘do X’ or ‘don’t do Y’ from the state. The indirectness in
Hobby Lobby is of a different sort—the government’s compulsion is direct, it
tells Hobby Lobby to do something; it’s the further choice by some employ-
ees that leads Hobby Lobby to claim the government has forced it to enable
a religiously wrongful act. One can debate whether this kind of attenuation
renders the burden on Hobby Lobby’s religious exercise insubstantial; I dis-
cuss that issue below. But the fact that the burden is indirect, in the sense
described here, is not the same as the way the burden in the Sherbert line of
cases was indirect. We should distinguish state action that burdens religious
exercise by compelling or forbidding conduct—where we can assess
150 Id. at 404.
151 Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 717–18 (1981).
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLP\9-1\HLP101.txt unknown Seq: 23  4-MAR-15 13:58
2015] Religious Freedom and (Other) Civil Liberties 183
whether such imperatives impose substantial burdens, without attention to
the nature of the ‘or else’—from state action where the only way to assess
substantiality is to consider the magnitude of the threat or offer from the
state (as in the unemployment compensation cases), because otherwise there
is no state action.
After dispensing in Part IV.B with an alternate theory advanced by
amici supporting HHS’ position, Justice Alito turns in Part IV.C to what he
deems HHS’ and the dissent’s “main argument” for why the Obamacare
birth control coverage requirement “does not impose a substantial burden on
the exercise of religion,” namely, that “the connection between what the
objecting parties must do [provide the relevant health insurance coverage]
and the end that they find to be morally wrong (destruction of an embryo) is
simply too attenuated.”152 It’s the employee, not the employer, who chooses
how to use her health insurance and thus who in some instances chooses to
use covered birth control (the ends of which are objectionable to the em-
ployer), or so HHS and the dissent maintain, says Alito.153 What follows is
inscrutable. Alito writes:
This argument dodges the question that RFRA presents (whether
the HHS mandate imposes a substantial burden on the ability of
the objecting parties to conduct business in accordance with their
religious beliefs) and instead addresses a very different question
that the federal courts have no business addressing (whether the
religious belief asserted in a RFRA case is reasonable).154
Putting aside again as harmless error Alito’s insistence on referring to
religious beliefs instead of exercise, HHS’ and the dissent’s “attenuation”
argument is not a challenge to the reasonableness (or truth, one might add)
of Hobby Lobby’s religious beliefs. It is a legal argument about what consti-
tutes a substantial burden on religious exercise under RFRA.
Justice Alito then explains that Hobby Lobby believes paying for the
birth control in question would be immoral (on religious grounds), insofar as
doing so would enable or facilitate another’s wrongful act.155 Alito adds that
whether and when such enabling or facilitating is wrongful is a difficult
religious and moral question.156 “HHS and the principal dissent,” claims Al-
ito, “in effect tell the plaintiffs that their beliefs are flawed.”157 This is
wrong. HHS’ and the dissent’s argument isn’t about whether Hobby Lobby is
correct on moral, philosophical, or religious grounds. It is a legal argument
about what constitutes a substantial burden on religious exercise under
RFRA. Unless there is a statutory or constitutional reason to defer to Hobby
152 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2777.
153 See id.
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Lobby’s views on this question,158 Alito should at this point, but does not,
join legal issue with HHS and the dissent and get into the thicket of what
types of burdens on religious exercise are properly deemed “substantial”
under RFRA.
Justice Alito next discusses Thomas, for the unobjectionable point that
it was not for courts to question the reasonableness of Thomas’ belief that it
was religiously wrong for him to make weapons but not to make the steel for
such weapons. He uses this point from Thomas to continue in this way:
Hobby Lobby “sincerely believe[s] that providing the insurance coverage
demanded by the HHS regulations lies on the forbidden side of the line, and
it is not for us to say that their religious beliefs are mistaken or insubstan-
tial.”159 Of course not. But the RFRA question isn’t whether Hobby Lobby’s
beliefs are mistaken or insubstantial; rather, the statutory question is whether
the law places a substantial burden on Hobby Lobby’s religious exercise, and
Hobby Lobby’s views on that issue must be considered, but cannot be dis-
positive, unless we have turned resolution of litigation over to one side of
the dispute. Quoting from Thomas, Alito adds, “our ‘narrow function . . . in
this context is to determine’ whether the line drawn reflects ‘an honest con-
viction,’ and there is no dispute that it does.”160 Indeed, there is no dispute on
that issue, but that’s not the issue.
Finally, Justice Alito states a legal conclusion: “Because the contracep-
tive mandate forces [plaintiffs] to pay an enormous sum of money . . . if
they insist on providing insurance coverage in accordance with their relig-
ious beliefs, the mandate clearly imposes a substantial burden on those be-
liefs.”161 As discussed above, the substantial burden inquiry should be about
what the law requires or forbids claimant to do, not about the in terrorem
penalty/tax. There’s no analysis in the majority opinion of whether paying
for group health insurance is, under RFRA, a substantial burden on Hobby
Lobby’s religious exercise, when some employees sometimes choose to use
such insurance to ends Hobby Lobby deems objectionable on religious
grounds. Alito thinks this is a tough moral and religious question that the
Court should not decide;162 but RFRA requires the Court to decide it.163
So, what about the key question: does the Obamacare requirement that
Hobby Lobby purchase health insurance for its employees—coverage that
includes some birth control methods to which Hobby Lobby objects on relig-
ious grounds—substantially burden Hobby Lobby’s religious exercise? Jus-
tice Ginsburg offers three reasons why we should think not: (i) The law
“carries no command that Hobby Lobby . . . purchase or provide the contra-
ceptives they find objectionable,”164 and, one might add, no command that
158 See supra note 139. R
159 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2779.
160 Id.
161 Id.
162 See id. at 2778.
163 In concurrence, Justice Kennedy also has nothing helpful to say about the substantial
burden part of the RFRA formula. See id. at 2785 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
164 Id. at 2799 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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Hobby Lobby perform abortions or permit abortions to be performed on
premises (remember it is the supposed abortifacient quality of the birth con-
trol in question to which Hobby Lobby objects). (ii) The law requires Hobby
Lobby to “direct money into undifferentiated funds that finance a wide vari-
ety of benefits under the comprehensive health plans,”165 thus, one might
add, establishing the generality of the program in question. (iii) “[T]he de-
cisions whether to claim benefits under the plans are made not by Hobby
Lobby . . . , but by the covered employees and dependents, in consultation
with their health care providers,”166 i.e., the connection between Hobby
Lobby and the end to which it objects (the use of certain contraceptives
covered under federal law) is attenuated in the way that proximate cause is
often thought to be broken in law, by the independent volition of a third
party. I agree with Justice Ginsburg that these factors combined are suffi-
cient to render the burden on Hobby Lobby’s religious exercise insubstantial
as a matter of law.
Once we accept that “substantial burden” is a legal, statutory term that
courts (and others) must interpret, we may consider analogies to other situa-
tions in which parties claim that the law will improperly attribute to them
beliefs or practices to which they object. Hobby Lobby objects to providing,
under legal compulsion, a benefit that is otherwise unobjectionable—health
care insurance—because Obamacare permits its employees to use that bene-
fit for a purpose to which Hobby Lobby objects on religious grounds. There
is an attenuation, an indirectness to the burden here; each Hobby Lobby
employee takes that health care insurance benefit and decides how to use it,
from a long list of possibilities permitted under the law. The benefit is also a
general one, in two senses—it applies to many employees, of companies run
according to religious principles and otherwise; and it covers many health
care options. These facts—of indirectness and generality—are of critical im-
portance in at least three areas of First Amendment law. The lesson from
these areas of doctrine is not favorable to Justice Alito’s Hobby Lobby
opinion.
First: Government provides money for schooling. That money may be
for specific things such as books or computers or teacher salaries, or it may
more generally be for tuition payments, either via targeted vouchers or via
tax expenditures such as deductions or exemptions for money spent on
schooling. The constitutional objection has been that the use of public funds
in religious schools implicates the government in religious education, im-
proper under the Establishment Clause. The answer from the Court has not
been that it is fine for the state to teach religious doctrinal truths. Rather, the
answer has been that even if the state’s money is ultimately used in a way
that advances the school’s religious mission, the state is not legally impli-
cated. There are some complexities here. Money that goes directly to a
church school’s bank account is still subject to possible ‘as-applied’ chal-
165 Id.
166 Id.
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lenges, i.e., even if the program is facially okay (say, money for books and
computers for both secular and religious schools), it may be subject to con-
stitutional challenge if plaintiff can show that the books and computers are
ultimately used to teach religious doctrine.167 But an important subset of
these school funding cases involves money not going directly to church
schools, but rather passing through the hands of private individuals.
Thus, in Mueller, parents received tax deductions for private school tui-
tion, secular and religious.168 Most of the usage was for religious schools,
and the kids in such schools were being taught religious doctrine (among
other things) through the money made available by the tax break.169 But this
program was upheld.170 Similarly, in Witters, the Court permitted a blind
student to use state funds for vocational education for the handicapped in a
graduate program for the ministry.171 The funds enabled religious training,
but again the Court was okay with that because the program was general and
the money first passed through Witters’ hands.172 He decided where to use it,
and that individual choice breaks the link to a possible Establishment Clause
violation.173 Finally, in Zelman, the most robust and far-reaching of these
precedents, the Court upheld the use of state-funded tuition vouchers, even
though used predominantly in private religious schools.174 The Court took an
expansive view of generality—the vouchers were not only part of a law that
allowed use in secular as well as religious schools (though used overwhelm-
ingly in religious ones), but also were part of the broader state-backed K-12
education system, predominantly secular.175 And the parents chose how to
use the vouchers—whether to walk across the street, as it were, to the church
school with the state’s money, was the parents’ choice, although the state
enabled this and knew it was likely to happen in many cases.176 The general-
ity of the benefit and the individual choice serve to break any possible Estab-
lishment Clause violation link to the state. This is so even though the
moneys are thoroughly intermingled and used, in part, to teach religious doc-
trine, something the state is otherwise forbidden to do.177
Attribution matters here to the proper legal outcome. There’s no natural
answer—different people have different, reasonable views about what
167 See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 840–44, 857 (2000) (O’Connor, J., concurring in
the judgment). The Court has also held that direct funding of religious school teacher salaries
(as part of a more general funding program) is unconstitutional even if for secular courses,
because of the risk that such teachers will teach the gospel, as it were, and because of the
entanglement concern with government monitoring to hedge against that risk. See id. at
859–60 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment); City of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S.
373, 386–87 (1985); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614–22 (1971).
168 Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 391 (1983).
169 See id. at 405.
170 See id.
171 Witters v. Wash. Dep’t of Services for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986).
172 See id. at 488–89.
173 See id.
174 Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
175 See id. at 650–51.
176 See id. at 652–53.
177 See id.
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counts as attribution. Hobby Lobby’s substantial burden argument is a kind
of attribution argument. In Hobby Lobby’s view, its health insurance pay-
ments enable or assist in the procurement of abortions, and thus we may
reasonably attribute such abortions to Hobby Lobby. But only if this attribu-
tion argument is correct, I am claiming, is it appropriate to conclude (under
RFRA) that Hobby Lobby’s religious exercise has been substantially bur-
dened. Once we move away from the patently incorrect deference to Hobby
Lobby regarding what counts as a substantial burden, we may then appropri-
ately look to how the law in other areas considers claims of improper ena-
bling, or attributing. The church school funding cases are illustrative here—
even though it’s true, in one sense, that the state is helping to fund religious
doctrinal education, we put that aside because the programs are general
(they’re not only to help church schools) and individual parents and/or stu-
dents choose how and where to use the benefit. That breaks the link to the
state, and thus obviates the possible constitutional violation. We do not prop-
erly legally attribute the doctrinal religious education to the state. Same here,
by analogy: Group health insurance is general in many senses—many com-
panies, including the Hobby Lobbies of the world, are covered; many em-
ployees are covered; many health care benefits are covered. Individuals
choose whether and how to use their health insurance. This attenuation of
the connection to Hobby Lobby is enough to render the burden on its relig-
ious exercise, from funding health care, insubstantial, because it is not le-
gally proper to attribute the abortifacient outcomes (if there are such) to
Hobby Lobby.178
Second: The Court has held that if public schools open space for vari-
ous forms of expression, they may not deny such space to religious groups
(or expression)—that would violate the Free Speech Clause—and permitting
religious groups to use such space does not violate the Establishment
Clause.179 The Free Speech Clause holding is not what interests me here. On
the Establishment Clause point, the state is enabling religious exercise when,
for example, it makes public school classroom space available for bible
study after school (which it has to do under the Free Speech Clause if it
178 In all of the settings I’m discussing in this analysis, it is easier to see how indirectness
breaks the legal attribution link than it is to see how generality does. Indirectness is a proxy for
standard proximate cause analysis. The generality point is about establishing the proper level
of categorization for what the relevant actor is doing—or, perhaps, is best seen as doing. Thus,
if a state gives tuition vouchers for secular and religious schools, it is benefiting religion just as
much as if it gives the vouchers for religious schools only. (Assuming that the same number of
parents/children use the vouchers at church schools in both scenarios.) But we see the state as
endorsing religion only in the latter setting. And thus we attribute the religious education to the
state only in the latter setting. Something similar, I am claiming, is going on in the Obamacare-
Hobby Lobby situation: if the federal government were insisting only that employers pay for
employees’ contraception that (arguably) may produce abortions, we should see that in a differ-
ent light than (as is actually the case) if the federal government insists that employers pay for a
broad array of health-care services and products.
179 See Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch. 533 U.S. 98 (2001); Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr.
Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263
(1981). We are not talking about the school’s own expression, either during class instruction or
otherwise.
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opens such space for other expressive activities). But the facts of generality
and individual choice matter here too, just as they do in the funding cases.
The classrooms are available after school to student groups generally—not
just to religious groups. And the students choose which groups to join,
which expression to engage in. Although the schools are aware that by open-
ing such space they will facilitate or enable religious exercise (among other
things), we do not properly attribute the religious exercise—or any other
expression that takes place in the classrooms after school—to the state. The
state provides the general benefit, as it were, and then the generality and
individual choice break any reasonable attribution link to the state.
The analogy to Hobby Lobby should be clear. Obamacare insists on a
broad package of health insurance benefits to a broad array of persons em-
ployed by a broad array of companies; some companies object to some of
those benefits on religious grounds; but it is their employees who choose
which benefits to take, which not to take, from the broad array of choices.
Sure, Hobby Lobby’s paying the insurance premiums enables and facilitates
what it objects to religiously (along with lots that it doesn’t object to relig-
iously). No more so, though, than the state enables and facilitates the relig-
ious expression of student groups in public school classrooms after school;
no more so than the state enables religious doctrinal teaching through tuition
vouchers. It is wrong to attribute to Hobby Lobby any particular medical act
performed with the insurance moneys. Wrong legally that is; paying for
group health insurance that may be used by some employees for some health
care to which Hobby Lobby objects on religious grounds is not a “substan-
tial burden” on Hobby Lobby’s religious exercise, if we are to understand
that term in a sensible way that fits with other areas of the law.
Third: The Court has developed a robust set of ‘right not to speak’
cases, or perhaps better put, ‘right not to foster the state’s or another person’s
speech’ cases. Sometimes called the rule against ‘compelled speech,’ this line
of cases started with Barnette, in which the Court considered West Virginia’s
requirement that school kids salute the flag and say the pledge of allegiance,
and held that objecting students must be given a right to remain silent.180 It
continued with Maynard, in which the Court assessed New Hampshire’s re-
quirement that state license plates bear the motto “Live Free or Die,” and
held that objecting car owners must be given a right to cover up the motto.181
And it continued in (among other cases) Hurley, in which the Court held that
Massachusetts may not require the organizer of the annual St. Patrick’s Day
parade (considered a private speech act) to host speech with which it dis-
agreed (a gay and lesbian Irish-American group that wished to march with a
banner so proclaiming).182 The exact doctrinal hook for these holdings is a
180 W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
181 Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 717 (1977).
182 Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Grp. of Boston, 515 U.S. 557,
581 (1995).
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bit tricky, as I have argued elsewhere,183 but they are widely understood as a
kind of negative Free Speech Clause right.184
Here I am interested in a set of cases that, although involving speech
compelled by the government (or the fostering of another’s speech com-
pelled by the government), came out the other way, i.e., in which the Court
distinguished the Barnette line of cases. In PruneYard, the Court upheld a
California requirement that privately owned shopping centers allow all man-
ner of speaker and leafleter on premises.185 In Southworth, the Court upheld
compelled student activities fees at the University of Wisconsin,186 even
though for some students some uses of such fees were objectionable, and
even though the Court had held in two prior cases that we usually have a
right not to fund speech of private parties to which we object.187 And in
FAIR, the Court allowed the federal government to insist that law schools
host the speech of military recruiters, in a manner equal to speech of other
legal recruiters, even though the schools objected to such hosting.188 All
three cases involved clear examples of the State compelling private parties to
host or foster the speech of others, apparently violating the understanding of
the right not to speak from the Barnette line of cases. So what was different?
In each of these three cases, the state action in question required the
private party to host a kind of public forum, open to all (relevant) speak-
ers.189 Just as when the state opens a public forum it may not discriminate
based on subject matter or point of view, and thus we do not properly attri-
bute any resulting speech to the State,190 so when a private party is com-
pelled to host a version of a public forum we do not properly attribute any
resulting speech to such party. The generality and choice factors break the
link. Generality is clear in all of these cases; choice results from various
speakers choosing to enter the shopping center premises to speak, or from
various student groups choosing to speak with student activities funds, or
from various legal recruiters engaging in expression on law school cam-
puses. The hosts, under legal compulsion, have enabled and facilitated
speech they don’t like, but that’s not enough for constitutional concern.
183 See Abner S. Greene, (Mis)Attribution, 87 DENVER U. L. REV. 833, 839–44 (2010);
Abner S. Greene, The Pledge of Allegiance Problem, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 451, 473–87
(1995).
184 See FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY, 80–85 (1982).
185 PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 88 (1980).
186 Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. System v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 233–35 (2000).
187 See Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1, 14–17 (1990); Abood v. Detroit Bd. of
Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 232–37 (1977). But see Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550,
560–67 (2005) (holding no such right exists if funding government speech).
188 Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 70
(2006). The law actually imposed a funding condition on universities, but the Court treated it
as if it imposed a direct obligation. See id. at 59–60.
189 There are two caveats: (i) the hosts could get out of the game entirely by ceasing to
own the shopping center, or ceasing to have compelled student activities fees, or ceasing to
allow any legal recruiters on campus; (ii) only relevant speakers were required to be hosted—
by which I mean only funded student groups in Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, and only legal
recruiters in FAIR, 547 U.S. 47.
190 See Abner S. Greene, Speech Platforms, 61 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1253 (2011).
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Again the analogy to Hobby Lobby should be clear. Obamacare benefits are
broad and the choice of which to claim is that of the individual employee;
although Hobby Lobby is enabling and facilitating (in some sense) whatever
results from a claimed benefit, we should not legally attribute any such out-
come (such as abortion) to Hobby Lobby.
The constitutional concerns in Hobby Lobby and in the three types of
cases I have covered are different, but those differences should not matter
for purposes of this discussion. In Hobby Lobby, there is a statutory right
protecting the free exercise of religion, and a question whether generality
and indirectness render a burden on such exercise legally insubstantial. In
the school funding cases and the public school classroom cases, there is a
question whether generality and indirectness remove any actionable Estab-
lishment Clause concern. In the compelled speech cases, the question is
whether generality and indirectness obviate a possible Free Speech Clause
violation. Maybe, one might argue, we should think differently about free
exercise of religion than we do about Establishment or Free Speech. Further-
more, in the Establishment Clause cases, the question is whether generality
and indirectness remove proper attribution to the state, whereas in the Free
Speech Clause and RFRA settings, the question is whether generality and
indirectness remove proper attribution to the individual (or corporate)
claimants.
These differences do not matter if the underlying parallels regarding
generality and indirectness track something similar in each setting. I believe
they do. In each setting, the question is whether, under legal compulsion, the
relevant actor (the government, in the Establishment Clause cases; the indi-
vidual, in the Free Speech Clause and RFRA cases) should be thought to
have enabled something that we properly deem legally harmful, requiring
redress. That determination, in turn, requires that we think about when we do
and don’t attribute certain outcomes to either the government or a private
person (or corporation). Thus, I have suggested, regarding the relevant cases
discussed above, that we do not, legally, attribute to the state the advance-
ment of religious doctrine in the school funding or classrooms cases; that we
do not, legally, attribute the various views that are aired to the host of speech
in the compelled speech cases; and that we should not, legally, attribute pos-
sibly abortifacient outcomes from some birth control to companies that are
required to pay for their employees’ health insurance, in the RFRA free exer-
cise of religion setting.
IV. ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LAW AND SAME-SEX MARRIAGE
Finally, a word about another issue that arose during this conference:191
the conflict between the increased recognition of same-sex marriage and re-
ligious beliefs to the contrary. Specifically, should businesses providing per-
191 Religious Accommodation in the Age of Civil Rights, Harvard Law School, April 3–5,
2014.
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sonal services to couples planning a wedding (or legally recognized
commitment ceremony)—say, photography192 or cake-making193—receive
exemptions from anti-discrimination laws that cover sexual orientation? Free
Exercise Clause doctrine would say no; these are laws of general applicabil-
ity and therefore rational basis scrutiny only would apply. But what if we
were to challenge Smith (as I have) or seek to apply a relevant state RFRA? I
will assume for purposes of argument that the application of anti-discrimina-
tion law in these settings might impose a substantial burden on the religious
exercise of some providers of the services in question. The question then
would be whether the state has a compelling interest in applying the anti-
discrimination law, and whether there is no less restrictive alternative to do-
ing so.
The answer, I believe, is not specific to religion, but rather should track
our understanding of the scope of the right of intimate association.194 Of
signal importance to this discussion is Justice Brennan’s majority opinion in
the Jaycees case.195 There, he laid out the right of intimate association, ex-
plaining that “certain kinds of personal bonds have played a critical role in
the culture and traditions of the Nation by cultivating and transmitting
shared ideals and beliefs; they thereby foster diversity and act as critical
buffers between the individual and the power of the State.”196 Family rela-
tionships are the paradigm of intimate association;197 abstracting from that,
we might say that “freedom of association as an intrinsic element of per-
sonal liberty”198 is “distinguished by such attributes as relative smallness, a
high degree of selectivity in decisions to begin and maintain the affiliation,
and seclusion from others in critical aspects of the relationship.”199 On the
other hand, “a large business enterprise”200 is “an association lacking these
qualities.”201 Between the poles of family and large businesses “lies a broad
192 See Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53 (NM 2013), cert. denied, 134 S.
Ct 1787 (2014).
193 See Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., CR 2013-0008 (Co. Admin. Ct., Dec. 6,
2013), http://perma.cc/Z7RA-YFS4.
194 Although Boy Scouts v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000), turned on the right of expressive
association, and that case involved a state anti-discrimination law, it is hard to see how the Boy
Scouts’ expressive association was infringed, and easier to see the case as one of intimate
association (although not necessarily correctly decided as such). See Laura A. Rosenbury,
Between Home and School, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 833, 856–68 (2007) (exploring this possibility
and other parental liberty theories). In any event, Dale is about a group not wanting to accept
someone as a member, 530 U.S at 644–45, which is not the factual scenario I am addressing
here.
195 Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618–20 (1984).
196 Id. at 618–19.
197 See id. at 619–20.




\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLP\9-1\HLP101.txt unknown Seq: 32  4-MAR-15 13:58
192 Harvard Law & Policy Review [Vol. 9
range of human relationships that may make greater or lesser claims to con-
stitutional protection from particular incursions by the State.”202
Justice Brennan then determined that the Jaycees were too large and
unselective to receive the protection of the right of intimate association, and
thus were properly subject to Minnesota anti-discrimination law regarding
gender (and other protected characteristics).203 What about a small, closely
held business, that provides personal services from the hands of the business
owners—say, photographing events or baking cakes for events? On the one
hand, such businesses are not large or detached in terms of the ownership-
worker-client relationships. They do share some qualities of family or
friendship for which we should think the right of intimate association would
attach. On the other hand, they are businesses, holding themselves out to the
public as taking money in exchange for services, and covered by various
federal, state, and local laws regarding public accommodations. (Of course
whether such laws should be limited by a right of intimate association is the
question, so that a particular law is capacious enough to cover a small mom
and pop business cannot itself answer the question at hand here.)
Perhaps the answer should be a bright-line rule—you may bake a cake
for whomever you want, or refuse to bake a cake for whomever you want, if
you are doing so out of love, charity, or gift. But once you decide to do so as
a business, for money, you forfeit your right to discriminate in your clientele
(at least regarding grounds covered by law). This is so, on both ends,
whether your reasons are religious or secular. On the other hand, as Robert
Vischer has suggested, when we are dealing with “roughly fungible goods
and services”204 and there is a sufficient market for the relevant good or
service, we might do better to protect the conscience of the small business
owner and ask the customer to hire another service provider, who does not
share the conscience-based objection to same-sex marriage. I will not try to
resolve the problem in this piece.
CONCLUSION
If we are to take value pluralism seriously, in the political/legal realm,
we must be cautious about when and where we insist on the correctness of
our beliefs about the good, and also about the right and the just. When relig-
ious adults choose to live their lives in a way that seems quite different from
how we would live ours—either in what they enjoy as valuable or in how
they order their affairs with each other—we should not insist that law trump
such practices, absent clear evidence of harm to others. There will be many
hard questions: Have the adults chosen freely, or freely enough? What about
their children? What constitutes cognizable harm to others that should trump
202 Id.
203 See id. at 621.
204 VISCHER, supra note 16, at 28. R
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religious freedom, and how much harm? As a template, though, strict scru-
tiny of state action substantially burdening religious exercise makes sense
for a nation committed not only to liberal values, but also to recognizing a
plurality of norms regarding how best to live, especially considering the ten-
uous grounding the state has to insist on its position at all times.
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